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THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN TAOS, 1847-1852

LAWRENCE R. MURPHY'"

THE

of the military was vital in consolidating the authority
of the United States government in the Southwest. As an army of
occupation, troops prevented dissidents among the populace from
mounting a successful revolt against the foreign intruders. For a
time the military was the only operating government. Its officers
promulgated the laws and selected officials. Moreover, it kept hostile Indians from overrunning the territory. Much has been .written
about such well-known military establishments as Fort Union and
Fort Defiance. Little is known about the smaller, less famous posts.
A study of the activities of the army in the northern New Mexican
town of Taos, may illuminate the importance of the soldier in establishing United States domination in New Mexico.
That the permanent occupation of the Southwest could not be
accomplished peacefully became clear during the early months of
1847 when word reached Santa Fe of a bloody anti-American
revolt in Taos. Nationalistic Mexican forces there, allied with
Indians from the nearby pueblo, had marched through the streets,
massacring and mutilating all who had joined sides with the
United States. New Mexico Governor Charles Bent, Taos Sheriff
Stephen Luis Lee, and attorney James W. Leal were among the
dead. The bloodshed spread rapidly to the nearby towns of Mora,
Rio Colorado, and Arroyo Hondo. 1
ROLE

"For assistance in the preparation of this study, the author is grateful to the
Graduate Research Council, Western Illinois University; the Helene Wurlitzer Foundation of New Mexico; Jack Boyer, Kit Carson Museum, Taos; and Bruce J. Dinges,
a graduate student at Rice University, Houston.
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Colonel Sterling Price, who assumed command of troops in New
Mexico upon the departure of General Stephen W. Kearny for
California, learned of the massacre on February 20. His Missouri
Volunteers plus regular dragoons and infantry totalling 353 men
moved quickly north from Santa Fe. A skirmish at Canada preceded major encounters with the rebels at La Joya (present Velarde) and Embudo along the Rio Grande. In early March Price
and his men captured the village of Don Fernando de Taos and
prepared to assault the nearby pueblo, where the rebels took refuge.
Only after a hard fight, climaxed by the storming of the Indian
church, did resistance collapse. By then some 150 Indians and
Mexican loyalists were dead. Forty-five soldiers received wounds
and seven died. 2 One of the casualties, Captain John H. K. Burgwin,3 later came to symbolize the military presence in Taos.
Price soon departed Taos, but the army remained. Captain W.
Z. Angney and Company A, Missouri Volunteers, stayed until
late March when Lieutenant Colonel David Willock arrived with
his cavalry company.4 Lewis H. Garrard, who visited northern
New Mexico shortly after the revolt, recalled the presence of the
army during the trials of the conspirators. Troops stood guard
throughout the village. The day the guilty were to be executed
more than two hundred soldiers marched in front of the jail. Their
commander, Colonel Willock, observed the scene from astride a
"handsome charger," while a mountain howitzer placed atop the
jail stood ready in case of trouble. The troops supervised the hangings, then retired to their quarters.1; Most left soon for other assignments, but three companies apparently remained. 6 By October
1847 the army had decided that permanent arrangements were
needed; the "Post of Don Fernando de Taos" was officially established. Garrisoning it were Companies G, H, and K of the 3rd
Regiment of Missouri Volunteers commanded by Major W. W.
Reynolds. 7
During their stay in Taos, the Missouri Volunteers accentuated rather than alleviated anti-American sentiments. Mrs. Thomas
Boggs, the stepdaughter of Governor Bent, recalled years later that
soldiers punished offending Indians by harnessing them to army
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ambulances and running them from the pueblo into town. "They
would reach us exhausted," she remembered, "the crack of the
driver's -whip heralding their approach, with blood streaming from
their unprotected backs and legs-one ambulance being followed
by another and another, racing as they came by." Soldiers who
became bored by such entertainment, she added, sometimes hanged
their victims. s Naturally such actions only increased the possibility
of later rebellion.
Not until a year after the establishment of the post are sufficient
records available to indicate the activities of the troops in Taos.
By then the Missouri Volunteers had been replaced by Company
I, 1st Dragoons. Major B. L. Beall commanded the unit, which
included Lieutenant John Whittlesey, 3 sergeants, 4 corporals, 46
privates, and 2 buglers. 9 Besides preventing a new uprising, the
troops were now called upon to protect much of northern New
Mexico from incursions by Apache, Ute, Kiowa, Comanche, and
other Indian marauders. 10
Lieutenant Whittlesey, who frequently commanded the post
when Beall was on detached service, quickly discovered the immense practical problems of maintaining troops in a remote and
often hostile community. The Missouri Volunteers, he reported,
had "left such a bad reputation" that few Taos residents would
rent suitable quarters to the government unless an American guaranteed payment. What houses were available frequently required
extensive repair to make them habitable. Moreover, obtaining forage for the government livestock or hiring pack mules for expeditions against the Indians proved difficult and expensive. l l Even
the army command seemed to forget about Taos. Whittlesey complained early in 1849 that his men had not been paid for five
months and pleaded that the paymaster be sent soon. 12
Even before these logistical problems were solved, the Taos detachment set out on a series of expeditions against the Indians.
During February 1849 Beall received orders to send troops east
across the Sangre de Cristo range to free several MexicanAmericans held captive near Bent's Fort. Accompanied by local
guides and company of Second Dragoons, Beall and Whittlesey
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spent two weeks crossing the rugged mountains. Their long winter
march proved futile, however. Indian Agent Thomas Fitzpatrick,
fearing violence from a large band of Indians camped along the
Arkansas, discouraged Beall from demanding the return of the
prisoners. Thus, without even mentioning their assignment, the
soldiers returned to Taos through a heavy snow storm which cost
them several animals. Nothing had been accomplished. 13
No sooner had Beall completed one fruitless expedition than he
sent Whittlesey on another, this time to pursue a band of Ute
committing depredations north of Taos. Fifty men left on March 5
"with a well-appointed Company of Spies and Guides" and a
mountain howitzer. They moved north past the settlement on the
Rio Colorado and into the San Luis Valley. While one platoon
stayed behind to transport the howitzer, Whittlesey led the remainder through the Rio Grande gorge to a Ute village. After
exchanging words with an Indian spokesman, Whittlesey's men
opened fire. Before the outnumbered dragoons could retreat into a
nearby forest two soldiers died, along with six or seven Indians.
The other platoon also encountered the Ute, producing another
five or six casualties. The soldiers must have been somewhat consoled, spending the night in abandoned Indian lodges before their
return to Taos, but they had certainly failed to strike a decisive
blow. 14
The limited success of the Ute expedition was offset by a tragedy which it indirectly caused. While soldiers battled Indians, the
famed mountaineer Bill Williams, botanist-physician Dr. Benjamin Kern, and several Mexican-American guides entered the
area. Members of John C. Fremont's fourth western expedition,
they had left the main party to recover some drawings, instruments, and other supplies cached nearby. They had reached Taos
and were returning north when the Ute, angered over Whittlesey's attack, found and captured them. Eventually the MexicanAmericans were released, but Williams and Kern were killed. 15
Partly as a result of such exasperating expeditions, army officials
realized by the spring of 1849 that too few troops were stationed in
Taos to control the Indians over such an extensive area. Since ad-
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ditional forces could not be secured from the East, Colonel J. M.
Washington commanding the department authorized the enlistment of local volunteer u:riits~16 Almost immediately Beall enrolled
a company of Taos citizens under the command of Captain J. M.
Valdez. 17 Much of the work of defending northern New Mexico
subsequently fell to them.
In order to make better use of the enlarged forte now under his
command, Colonel Washington also ordered the establishment of
several subsidiary posts comprised of men on temporary detached
service from Taos. Early in April 1849, for example, 85 volunteers
left to patrol the plains around Las Vegas. IS A month later Beall
received orders to establish a station at "Sangre de Christo" in the
San Luis Valley eighty miles north of Taos. It was designed to protect the older frontier settlements and a new mining camp in the
area from Ute and Apache. 19 Beall selected a location near the
junction of Trinchera and Ute Creeks and soon had men from
Captain Valdez' volunteer company at work building a stockade. 20
But in less than a month he received new instructions to abandon
the project and return the soldiers. 21 In spite of Lieutenant Whittlesey's protests that withdrawal of the troops would expose the
"Rio Colorado frontier" to the "full fury" of the Indians/2 the
order stood, and the post was abandoned. Once more a great deal of
time and effort had been expended for naught. Thereafter, Taos
resumed the responsibility for protecting the San Luis Valley.
During the second half'of 1849 major attention was directed to
protecting northeastern New Mexico from attacks by the Jicarilla
Apache. The establishment of new ranches along the edge of the
Sangre de Cristos during the previous year invited raids which
eventually necessitated stationing military forces in the area. 23
News that the Apache were "robbing everywhere throughout the
mountains" reached Whittlesey in midsummer. To prevent a massacre and, hopefully, to chastise the hostiles, he ordered a sergeant
with 15 dragoons and 30 volunteers to the Rayado. 24 During the
fall Major William Grier mounted a major campaign against the
Apache, further depleting the Taos garrison. 25 For a time volunteers replaced the dragoons, but after Valdez' company was mus-
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tered out of the service in December, the full responsibility for
staffing the outpost fell on the much overworked detachment at
Taos. 26 'This command has been constantly engaged in active
service against the hostile Indians in N [ew] Mexico," complained
Beall at the end of the year, "and our force is weak & should be
releaved."27
As if combating hostile Indians was not enough to occupy the
exhausted Taos troops, increasing restlessness among the Pueblos
and Mexican-Americans in northern New Mexico suggested the
possibility of another revolt. James S. Calhoun, Territorial Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs, first suspected trouble
when he visited Taos Pueblo in January 1850' The Indians were
in a "moody and dissatisfied state" and complained to him of encroachments on their land, violations of their traditions, and arbitrary appointment of their officials by the government in Santa Fe.
"The wrongs to which the Pueblo Indians are subjected," Calhoun
concluded, "are inconceivable and ought to be remedied without a
moment's delay."28 He promised to convey their grievances to the
proper authorities in Washington. Certain, however, that mischievous Taos residents had agitated the Indians for their own
political purposes, Calhoun also suggested that in the future
Pueblo officials seek the counsel of Beall, Grier, Whittlesey, other
army officers, or Judge Charles Beaubien. All were friends who
could be trusted. 29
Despite Calhoun's warnings of possible unrest, the contingent at
Taos continually diminished in strength. Many soldiers remained
on duty at Rayado, while others were sent to reoccupy a post at
Abiquiu in northeastern New Mexico. 30 Major Beall's pleas that
his forces were "barely sufficient" to keep the Ute and Apache from
raiding Taos, much less put down a Pueblo uprising, brought
nothing more than explanations that "no disposable force" could
be spared to reinforce the detachment. 31 By May 27 all regular
troops had withdrawn from Taos. 32
Officials who had almost forgotten the bloody massacre in Taos
less than three years before were suddenly reminded of it by a
letter from Lieutenant Whittlesey in June. The young officer,
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whose long experience qualified him to comment on conditions in
the area, warned that troops were once again needed in Taos. The
political controversy over whether New Mexico should be a state
or a territory had aroused the "lower class" of Mexican-Americans
to the extent that many "intelligent citizens" feared a violent
outbreak.
Though not disposed myself to be an alarmist, yet I feel it my duty to
express an opinion that it is unsafe to leave Taos any longer without
at least a detachment of ten or fifteen men. Considerable public
property-some arms, ammunition, & c-are now there with no other
guard than some half-dozen ill-armed teamsters.

Whittlesey concluded by reminding his superiors that "the revolutionary character of the inhabitants" of Taos was "well-known and
should be guarded against."33
As soon as Colonel John Munroe, now commanding the Ninth
Military Department, received the warning, he wrote Major Grier,
who was still at Rayado, asking him to dispatch a company of men
back across the mountains. Grier indicated no surprise at hearing of
the rumored unrest, commenting that he had "not the slightest confidence in the honesty, patriotism, or fidelity of the people of the
Taos Valley" whom he regarded as "but slightly superior to the
Apaches." He did agree that it was probably wise to station troops
in the area until the political campaign had ended and ordered
Lieutenant Oliver H. P. Taylor and a company of soldiers to Taos.
He also promised to return with his own men as soon as possible. 34
Contrary to the expectations of Whittlesey, troops stationed at
Taos during the fall and winter found conditions extremely quiet.
If Taylor and Grier spent any time at the post, they filed no returns,
and it was not officially "re-occupied" until the arrival of Company
H, 3rd Infantry, in mid-July. Soon Captain William H. Gordon
assumed command. 35 Taos residents may have feared that the
soldiers would not stay for the winter, for late that same month
they wrote Munroe. Pointing out that within a few days the
Apache had entered th.e village of Rio Colorado and were approaching Taos, they asked him to send out a major expedition against
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them. 36 The troops stayed, but no campaigns seem to have been
mounted during the months that followed. Even the Pueblos and
Mexican-Americans remained unusually peacefuI.51
The only important development came in early September
1850, when Colonel George A. McCall arrived on an official inspection of New Mexico installations. He found only forty-four
men and one officer, Lieutenant Andrew Jackson, in camp.
McCall's description of supply and housing problems closely resembled Whittlesey's earlier report. For quarters, stables, and
storerooms, the government had again rented a number of "the
usual adobe dwellings of the country" at a total cost of $ I 20 per
month. Forage and fodder could be produced locally but only at
high prices, due at least in part to the "bad management" of
farmers in the area. Generally, however, McCall found the
quarters clean, the books well kept, and the overall appearance of
things excellent. 58
Having described the post and its garrison, McCall went on to
evaluate its importance. He reiterated the consistent military
opinion that the residents of Taos were "the most turbulent in New
Mexico" and that the Pueblo Indians nearby "still entertain a
smothered feeling of animosity against the Americans." As a precaution, therefore, he recommended that a half-company of infantry be stationed in Taos to enforce the laws and "keep these
people quiet." On the other hand, he argued with equal firmness
that Taos "had nothing to recommend it" as a base for campaigns
against the Ute and Apache. He much preferred sites which were
closer to Indian country and less expensive to maintain. 59
Not only McCall recommended a reduced role for the Taos
detachment. In January 185 I, when Colonel Munroe evaluated
the posts in his department for the Adjutant General, he concluded
that "for military purposes" no troops were needed in Taos as long
as the installations were maintained at Rayado and Abiquiu. "For
civil considerations," however, it might be well to keep an infantry
. "40
company there "for a tIme.
A letter from Charles Beaubien in mid-June reinforced the many
fears that another Taos uprising might yet take place. Beaubien, an
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old and respected Taos resident,41 reported in terms remarkably
similar to those Whittlesey voiced exactly a year before. He had
become convinced that many "lower class" Taos residents contemplated a "rebellion against the constituted United States
authorities." Secret meetings had been held; rumors circulated in
an attempt to arouse the populace. Very possibly another "massacre" of the few Americans and foreigners would be attempted.
The situation was ever more critical because of the close proximity
of the Jicarilla Apache, who had been buying whiskey within a
few miles of town. Clandestine conferences between the Ute and
the Pueblos foreshadowed trouble. Only by sending a company of
artillery or more mounted troops to augment the meager force in
the valley, Beaubien warned, could tragedy be averted. 42
·Beaubien's letter produced the kind of response which previous
pleas had failed to bring. Calhoun immediately forwarded a copy
to Colonel John Munroe at military headquarters with a note suggesting that the "utmost vigilance" would be necessary to "prevent
the outbreak desired by the restless. "43 Quickly the commander
moved to reinforce his troops. On June 14 Munroe ordered Major
H. 1. Kendrick vyith two companies of artillery to Taos. Although
his task was to "enquire fully into all the unrest connected with
the contemplated rebellion," the sixty men and two howitzers he
took suggested stronger action.44
Surprisingly, not everyone agreed with Munroe's swift action.
Major Gordon, still commanding troops in Taos, took offense; his
opinions had not been solicited. He argued that the whole affair
(apparently including Beaubien's letter) had "originated through
political feeling." In fact scheming Americans had informed the
Mexican-Americans of a possible revolution. Gordon further
argued that the sudden arrival of so many troops commanded by an
officer senior to himself had "operat[ed] unfavorably upon my
character with this people.. They know I am being relieved of
command."45 Munroe and his adjutant attempted in vain to explain
their action, insisting that they had intended no reRection on
Gordon's ability.46 Still hard feelings no doubt remained.
Major Kendrick's report filed from Taos June 22 reinforced

42

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW XLVII: 1 1972

Gordon's view that Beaubien had grossly exaggerated the likelihood
of an uprising. "After the fullest possible inquiry," he concluded
that although some Mexicans might have considered violence,
their plans included only robbery and plund,er. He could find no
evidence of insurrection. Since the Apache had now disappeared
and even the local priest, apparently Jose Antonio Martinez, saw
no need for the troops, Kendrick recommended that they be withdrawn. Munroe agreed, and by month's end the soldiers had returned to Santa Fe. 47
Once fears of a rebellion subsided, military officials again considered abandoning the Taos installation. The idea received new
support from Colonel E. V. Sumner, who took command of the
Ninth Military Department in July. Almost immediately he began
consolidating the multitude of smaller posts into a few major
forts. The establishment of Fort Union as department headquarters and supply center climaxed this program. Sumner also
believed that New Mexico towns provided a poor environment for
American soldiers, and thus he stationed all troops in remote, rural
10cations. 48 As a result, in August Sumner announced his intention
to abandon Taos. Larger posts would be established along the
lower Rio Grande at Valverde and to the north in Ute and Apache
country.49
The new district commander soon discovered that withdrawing
troops from Taos was more difficult than it seemed. As a first step,
late in October, he ordered Gordon and his infantry company to
move to La Joya (Velarde) for the winter. Before leaving they were
to make "suitable arrangements" for protecting the flour stockpiled
in Taos. 50 No sooner had word of this action reached Taos than
residents began to plead that the troops remain. Ceran St. Vrain,
a well-known mountaineer and businessman, asked that at least a
company of dragoons stay for the winter and offered to furnish
them 2,000 sacks of corn. 51 Other citizens volunteered to provide
"sufficient and comfortable quarters." They also guaranteed that
corn would be available at reasonable prices. As a result, just after
Gordon reached his winter station: he received instructions sending
him back to Taos. "On your arrival," an explanatory letter in-
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structed him, "you will call upon the citizens to point out the
quarters intended for your command." If the accommodations
proved unsuitable, he was to "require them to comply with their
agreement."52
Although Gordon and about seventy soldiers remained in Taos
throughout the winter and spring of 1851-1852, they apparently
did little except provide a convenient market for the supplies of
local farmers and merchants. Perhaps this was their major purpose.
John Greiner, an Indian agent, visited Taos in October. He reported that although the Kiowa and Arapaho had recently attacked
a Ute village near the Rio Colorado (now anglicized to "Red
River"), driven off fifty head of livestock, and captured several
women and children, the soldiers in Taos could "afford no assistance." He pleaded that some means be devised to protect the peaceful Ute from their enemies.53 Late in March 1852, Sumner prepared to pacify the Indians of the San Luis Valley by establishing a
new post, Fort Massachusetts, eighty miles north of Taos. 54 The
question of what would happen to the older installation in Taos
remained to be answered.
After several years of indecision, the army finally acted during
the summer of 1852. In order to provide a garrison at Fort Massachusetts, Gordon's Company H, 3rd Infantry, left Taos with
Major George A. H. Blake to take up station in the San Luis
Valley.55 On June 14, 1852, the post at Fernando de Taos was
officially abandoned.56 Not for long would it lack military protection, however. Less than two months later, on August 7, Company
I, 1st dragoons reached Taos under the command of Captain
Robert Ransom, Jr. to establish a new post. Located ten miles
southwest of Taos and fifteen miles from the Rio Grande, this became Cantonment Burgwin,57 named in honor of Captain John
H. K. Burgwin who died in the Battle of Taos Pueblo in 1847.58
Thus began a new era in the military history of northern New
Mexico.
During a half-decade of presence in Taos the army had accomplished a great deal. Despite continuing rumors of unrest, a second
Taos Rebellion never occurred; slowly the Mexican-Americans and

44

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW XLVII: 1 1972

Pueblo Indians in the region accepted the inevitability of United
States occupation. They also learned to sell agricultural products to
the military. Moreover, continuing though never conclusive forays
against the Indians in the area assured a greater measure of security
for the town of Taos and the ranches surrounding it. As a result the
economy of the region prospered.
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and the Winning of the Southwest (Norman, 1965), p. 60.
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